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Three Strikes legislation
Three Strikes and You're Out ("Three Strikes") laws mandate long sentences for
certain habitual offenders, usually 25 years to life in prison for third-time violent
offenders. Since 1993, Three Strikes has been implemented for federal offenses
and in at least 25 states. 1
Although they share a common name, Three Strikes laws are quite diverse.
The number of offenses that trigger the Three Strikes mechanism, the types of
crimes counted as strikes, and the sentences mandated upon conviction vary widely.
Most states have relatively narrow laws and have not sentenced many prisoners
under Three Strikes. The laws of most states limit strikes-eligible offenses to a
small number of violent felonies, and require three violations to trigger a mandatory sentence such as life without parole, or 25 years to life. In some states, the law
can be triggered by more or fewer than three strikes (Clark et al., 1997).
The broadest and most widely used Three Strikes law was implemented in
California in 1994 and not modified until20 13. Offenses eligible to count as strikes
in California include 21 "violent" felonies and 25 "serious" felonies, with some
overlap between the two categories. If an offender already has one strike and then
commits any of the state's approximately 500 felonies, the sentence is automatically doubled. With two strikes, any additional felony conviction sends the offender to prison for 25 years to life. The law requires a state prison sentence in all
Three Strikes cases, restricts "good time" credits to 20 percent, and prohibits plea
bargaining. As of October 2005, over 87,500 individuals had been sentenced under
the second- and third-strike provisions of California's Three Strikes law, including
over 7,500 offenders who received a sentence of 25 years to life in prison for a
third strike (Legislative Analyst's Office, 2005). In comparison, no other state has
sentenced more than 400 offenders under a Three Strikes law (Chen, 2008a). However, in order to reform the harsh nature of the Three Strikes legislation, California
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Despite Racial Disparities and Excessive Punishments,
U.S. Supreme Court Supports Three Strikes
Lockyear v. Andrade/ 538 U.S. 63 (2003)

For stealing about $150 worth of videotapes, Leandro Andrade was found
guilty of two felony counts of petty theft. With previous felony convictions on
his record, he was sentenced to two consecutive terms of 25 years to life under
California's Three Strikes law. Andrade appealed his case all the way to the U.S.
Supreme Court, based on an argument that the sentence was in violation of the
Constitution's protection against cruel and unusual punishment under the
Eighth Amendment. In a 5 to 4 decision decided on March 5, 2003, the court
upheld his sentence, stating that the previously imposed sentence was not
grossly disproportionate to the offenses he committed.
Ewing

v. California/ 538 U.S.

11 (2003)

On March 5, 2003, the Supreme Court also upheld the 25-years-to.-life sentence of Gary Ewing, who while on parole stole three golf clubs valued at $399
each. Ewing had been given the harsh sentence for the relatively minor crime
due to the fact that he had previously been convicted of four felonies. In another 5 to 4 decision, the Court decided that Ewing's claim that his sentence
was highly disproportionate to the offense with which he was charged was
unfounded. His sentence was affirmed.
In both the Locl<year and Ewing cases, under California law, the thefts cou ld
have been treated as misdemeanors, which would have allowed Andrade
and Ewing to avoid Three Strikes sentencing. Legal scholars have questioned
whether the prosecutorial and judicial discretion exercised in these cases may
have been influenced by the race and class status of the defendants. Andrade
was an admitted heroin addict since 1977. Ewing was a long-time drug addict
who was dying of AIDS at the time of his sentencing.
According to a report by the Policy Institute in Washington, D.C., during the
first three years after the law took effect, African Americans were imprisoned
under Ca lifornia's Three Strikes law at a rate 13 times that of Whites.
voters passed Proposition 36 in November 2012 (effective in 2013). According to
this law, with two strikes, an offender would be sentenced to 25 years to life if and
only if the offender commits an additional felony of a serious or violent nature
(previously, the law had stated that any felony would induce a long-term sentence).
With this reformative law, the state of California is estimated. to save up to
$90 million a year, and approximately 3,000 inmates serving life sentences would
be eligible to petition for a reduced sentence (Sankin, 2012).
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African American men, who constitute only about 3 percent of California's
population, represent approximately 44 percent of third-strikers among California
prison inmates (U.S. Census Bureau, 2006; California Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation, 2008). Some of the facial disparities in Three Strikes sentencing are explained by differences between Blacks and Whites in factors such as offenses committed, prior record, and parole status; however, after these ''legally
relevant" factors are taken into account, Blacks remain significantly more likely
than Whites to receive third-strike sentences (Chen, 2008b).
Uneven application of prosecutorial or judicial discretion may be responsible
for some of the Black/White disparity in Three Strikes sentences. A prosecuting
attorney may file a motion to dismiss one or more prior convictions that would
otherwise count as strikes, thus sparing a defendant the mandatory third-strike sentence of 25 years to life in prison if convicted (Legislative Analyst's Office, 2005).
Discretion may also be exercised by prosecutors or judges to charge multiple
counts, including strikes, from a single incident, or to charge certain offenses
known as "wobblers" as either felonies (which trigger Three Strikes) or misdemeanors (which carry a maximum sentence of one year in jail) (Legislative Analyst's
Office, 2005; Ricciardulli, 2002). The gap between Blacks and Whltes in Third
Strikes sentences is greater for "wobblers" than for offenses that are unequivocally
charged as felonies, suggesting that discretion in "wobbler" charging may be exercised to the detriment of African American defendants (Chen, 2008b).
Studies of the crime-reduction effects of Three Strikes laws have produced
mixed results. Ramirez and Crano (2003) detect few immediate impacts of Three
Strikes on crime in California, some deterrence and incapacitation effects over
time for violent and premeditated offenses and for "minor" crimes not targeted by
Three Strikes, and no impacts on drug offenses. Worrall (2004) finds "virtually no
deterrent or incapacitative effects on serious crime." Kovandzic, Sloan, and Vieratis
(2002; 2004) find significant declines in crime trends for some offenses in some
stat~s in the aftermath of Three Strikes' adoption, but they also find significant increases in roughly the same number of states, suggesting either that the findings
were either random statistical artifacts or that the law has both positive and negative impacts that cancel each other out on the whole. The only exception to this
finding is for rates of homicide, for which more significant increases than declines
are found (Kovandzic et al., 2004). The finding supports the hypothesis that criminals who face a Three Strikes sentence may have an increased incentive to kill
potential witnesses.
The law's limited proven crime-reduction effects combined with high costs led
some critics to call for reform of the law. In 2005, California's Three Strikes policy
cost approximately $500 million per year to implement, with expenses expected to
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Three Strikes Laws in Other Places
In 1994, the state of Georgia enacted a tough "two strikes" law that imposed a
life sentence for a second drug offense. By 1995, the state had invoked the law
against only 1 percent of White defendants facing a second drug conviction,
but against more than 16 percent of el igible Black defendants. The result: by
2000, 98.4 percent of those serving life sentences in Georgia under its two
strikes provision were Black.

escalate dramatically in the long run (Legislative Analyst's Office, 2005). The increased rate of incarceration associated with the law also imposed human and social
costs for sentenced individuals, their families, and their communities (for discussion
see, e.g., Mauer and Chesney-Lind, 2002; Travis, 2002; Travis and Waul, 2003).
Those social costs were borne disproportionately by African American men. The full
impact of the Proposition 36 changes remain to be seen but, another cost of Three
Strikes laws may be that they seriously damage the perception of fairness and legitimacy in the criminal sentencing process, particularly among African Americans.
Elsa Chen

Note
1. States with Three Strikes laws are Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New
Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah,
Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. Source for all states except Alaska: National
Conference of State Legislatures, "Three Strikes" Legislation Update, December 1997.
Alaska law information obtained via personal communication with Ms. Teri Carnes, Senior
Staff Associate, Alaska Judicial Council, September 22, 2006.
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